Nonparametric Production Analysis under Alternative Price Conditions by Laurens Cherchye et al.
1
NON-PARAMETRIC PRODUCTION ANALYSIS UNDER
ALTERNATIVE PRICE CONDITIONS
Laurens Cherchye (corresponding author)
Catholic University of Leuven




Phone: +32 16 326854 / Fax: +32 16 326796
Timo Kuosmanen
Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration
Department of Economics and Management Science





3062 PA Rotterdam, THE NETHERLANDS
ABSTRACT
The literature on non-parametric production analysis has formulated tests for profit
maximizing behavior that do not require a parametric specification of technology.
Negative test results have conventionally been interpreted as inefficiency, or have been
attributed to data perturbations. In this paper, we exploit the possibility that negative test
results reveal violations of the underlying neoclassical assumption that prices are
exogenously fixed and perfectly certain. We propose non-parametric tests that do allow
for endogenous price formation and price uncertainty. In addition, we investigate how to
recover the technology and how to forecast behavior in new economic situations.
Key words: non-parametric production analysis, endogenous price formation, price
uncertainty2
1.  INTRODUCTION
Within the neoclassical paradigm, firms are typically assumed to maximize profits.
Given its crucial role in the neoclassical theory of the firm, it is interesting to test this
assumption empirically. For a long time, the standard tests started from a functional
form for the production frontier. Unfortunately, economic theory does not imply a
particular functional form, and reliable empirical specification tests are not available in
many cases.
Alternative,  non-parametric  testing tools for analyzing firm behavior have been
introduced. These tools are non-parametric because they do not need a parametric
specification of the production technology. Instead, only observed production plans are
assumed to be feasible. Apart from testing for profit maximization, the non-parametric
approach can derive empirical approximations for the production technology and
forecast firm behavior. Afriat (1972) and Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) initiated this
approach. Varian (1984) provides an insightful overview of the main results. The non-
parametric approach has been applied to a multitude of problems (e.g. Lim and
Shumway, 1992; and Chavas and Cox, 1995), and several theoretical extensions have
been proposed (e.g. Chavas and Cox, 1990, 1992; and Silva and Stefanou, 1996).
The non-parametric tests frequently suggest violations of profit maximization. Such
violations can be interpreted as non-optimizing behavior. In this respect, there is an
intimate relationship between the non-parametric approach to production analysis and
the efficiency measurement literature, which builds mainly on the classic articles by
Debreu (1951), Koopmans (1951) and Farrell (1957). Banker and Maindiratta (1988)3
and Färe and Grosskopf (1995) have further explored this link. In general, however,
economists have problems with the nature and interpretation of inefficiency. In fact,
economic theory has adopted rationality as its most fundamental maintained assumption.
See for example the sharp critique by Stigler (1976) on Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency
concept.
Inaccurate measurement of the firm data constitutes an alternative interpretation of
violations. Varian (1985) has proposed tests that account for measurement error, and
several alternative statistical testing procedures have been developed (see e.g. Matzkin,
1994, for an overview). In a similar vein, Varian (1990) presented a “goodness-of-fit”
approach to the estimation of the economic significance of violations of the consistency
tests.
In this paper, we explore a third possibility: negative test results may reveal violations of
the underlying “neoclassical” assumptions that firms take prices as exogenously fixed
and perfectly certain. Frequently, these assumptions are too stringent. In many cases, the
production plans of individual firms affect the market prices. In addition, in many cases
there is uncertainty about uncontrollable ex post prices when firms ex ante fix their
production plans. Note that price endogeneity and price uncertainty often occur
simultaneously. For example, under endogenous prices a particular production plan can
be associated with different price equilibria (compare with Debreu, 1970; see also
Grodal, 1996), which immediately implies ex ante price uncertainty. In addition, firm
owners usually imperfectly observe the interaction between firm actions on the one hand
and market prices on the other, which introduces further price uncertainty. If prices are
endogenous and/or uncertain, the standard tests for profit maximizing firm behavior are4
no longer appropriate. Apparently inefficient firms may actually be efficient and,
accordingly, profit-maximizing behavior may falsely be rejected.
A whole literature has emerged which centers on the derivation of equilibrium behavior
starting from weaker versions of the basic neoclassical hypotheses. As for endogenous
prices, the classic references are Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) who focused
on partial equilibria, whereas Negishi (1961) has first proposed extensions to general
equilibrium settings. Two classic contributions on price uncertainty are the articles by
McCall (1967) and Sandmo (1971). However, the literature on non-parametric
production analysis has largely ignored these alternative price conditions thus far. We
complement the conventional testing tools with non-parametric tests for profit
maximizing behavior under the more complicated but often more realistic conditions of
endogenous and uncertain prices. In addition, we investigate the possibility to recover
the technology, and to forecast firm behavior.
The paper is further organized as follows. Section 2 develops non-parametric testing
tools that allow for endogenous and uncertain prices. That section focuses on minimal
assumptions with respect to the price distribution, the objectives of the firm, and the
production technology. Obviously, such a non-parametric orientation can reduce
discriminating power. However, our analysis can serve as a starting point for analyses
that include additional hypotheses. In this respect, Section 3 discusses various kinds of
additional (price, preference and technology) assumptions and how such assumptions
can be included in the analysis. Section 4 subsequently considers how we could recover
the technology and forecast firm behavior in new economic situations. Section 5
discusses some computational issues. The new tools are illustrated using a numerical5
example in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 provides a discussion of our results as well as
directions for further research. For expositional convenience, we focus on the profit
maximization hypothesis exclusively. However, a straightforwardly analogous treatment
applies to the less restrictive cost minimization and revenue maximization assumptions.
2.  TESTING FOR CONSISTENCY WITH PROFIT MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR
INCLUDING PRICE ENDOGENEITY AND UNCERTAINTY: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
We analyze the optimizing behavior of n firms under restrictions for the production
possibilities and the price formation process. Specifically, firms select a (non-zero)
netput vector  T y y y
q Î = ) ... (
1  from the production possibility set 
q T Â Í . Positive
components of y represent outputs and negative components represent inputs. We
assume that the decision on the netputs to be produced must be taken prior to the sales
date, at which the market prices become known. The beliefs of firm j about the prices
are summarized by a subjective conditional distribution function  () [] 1 , 0 : ® Â × +
q
j y F ,
{} n j ,..., 1 Î , which assigns a cumulative probability density to (non-zero) price vectors
q T q p p p + Â Î = ) ... (
1  conditional upon the selected netput vector 
q y Â Î . Note that we
deviate from the traditional framework by using a conditional distribution function to
represent the price formation process, hence allowing for uncertain and endogenous
prices. Also note that we use a firm-specific distribution function, so as to allow for
differences in the economic microenvironment.6
Following McCall (1967) and Sandmo (1971), among others, we assume that firm
preferences can be represented in expected utility form, with a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function  ()
1 1 : Â ® Â × j U  that is defined over profit yp.  This may
appear a strong assumption. In recent years, non-expected utility theories for individual
decision making have become increasingly popular (see Starmer, 2000, for a review).
Moreover, many firm decisions are taken by a group of individuals, and group
preferences may not always satisfy the transitivity axiom required for the existence of a
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Nevertheless, the expected utility
framework remains a standard analytical tool, mainly because of its analytical
tractability. Furthermore, there are many firms in which essentially one person makes
the decisions, and there are presumably many firms in which preferences are sufficiently
similar within the group of decision makers to guarantee the existence of a group
preference function. Finally, we emphasize that the below tests also apply for a whole
range of non-expected utility theories of choice behavior under uncertainty.
Under the above assumptions, the optimal netput vector for the j-th firm is obtained as
the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:






y p F yp U max .
Hence, the following statistic can test whether the observed behavior of the j-th firm, say
j y , is consistent with constrained optimizing behavior:
(2) () () ()( ) ò ò
+ + Â Î Â Î
Î ¶ - ¶ =
q q p




j j j y p F p y U y p F yp U T U F y max ) , , , ( q ,7
Obviously, a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal firm behavior is
0 ) , , , ( = T U F y j j j q .
If complete information about the price distribution ( j F ), the firm preferences ( j U ) and
the production possibilities (T) were available, we could readily compute
) , , , ( T U F y j j j q . However, in practice such complete information is typically not
available and only necessary tests for optimal behavior can be designed.
INCLUDING PRICE ENDOGENEITY AND UNCERTAINTY: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We construct necessary tests for optimal firm behavior by gradually weakening the
informational requirement. We focus on minimal assumptions with respect to the price
distribution, the objectives of the firm, and the production technology. Section 3
discusses various kinds of additional (price, preference and technology) information and
how that information can be included in the analysis, so as to increase the discriminating
power of the tests.
First, to reduce the informational requirement for the price distribution ( j F ), we assume
that for each firm j a price domain  j D  is observed that contains all price vectors that
have a strictly positive probability at some feasible netput vector, i.e.
() { } 0 : > ¶ Î $ Â Î Ê Ê Â + + y p F T y p D j
q
j
q . It is often possible to construct 
q
j D + Â Ì  by
exploiting some minimal application-specific information. For example, economic
theory suggests that the cost of equity capital exceeds that of debt because equity8
involves more risk for the capital suppliers than debt does (see e.g. Kuosmanen and
Post, 1999a). Similarly, we could use the stylized fact that the wage rate for white-collar
workers is higher than that for blue-collar workers.
Using  j D  we obtain the following conservative test statistic
(3)   ( ) ( ) p y U p y U T U D y j j
D p
j D p T y
j j j
j j Î Î Î - = max min max ) , , , ( J .
This statistic bounds  ) , , , ( T U F y j j j q  from below, i.e.
) , , , ( ) , , , ( T U F y T U D y j j j j j j q J £ . Hence, a necessary condition for optimal behavior
is 0 ) , , , ( £ T U D y j j j J .
Usually, the specification of firm preferences ( j U)  is also problematic. Let us only
assume that firm utility is monotonically increasing in profit, i.e.
z z z z z U z U j j ¢ ³ Â Î ¢ " ¢ ³ : , ) ( ) (.  T h e n
(4)  0 max min max ) , , ( > - =
Î Î Î
p y p y T D y j




implies 0 ) , , , ( > T U D y j j j J , and we get  0 ) , , ( £ T D y j j r  as a necessary condition for
optimal firm behavior. Since  j U  is assumed to be increasing in profit, we can also refer
to such optimal firm behavior as (ex ante) “profit maximizing” behavior.9
Finally, a full specification of the production set T is normally not available. However,
an empirical approximation can be obtained from observed firm behavior, say
{} n y y S ,..., 1 = . We will adhere to the standard assumption that the observed netput
vectors are feasible, i.e.  T S Í . (Note, however, that our approach can be extended to
include measurement error along the lines of e.g. Varian (1985).) Since  T S Í , we can
use S as an empirical production set. Specifically,  0 ) , , ( £ S D y j j r  gives a necessary
condition for optimal behavior, because  T S Í  implies  ) , , ( ) , , ( T D y S D y j j j j r r £ . We
will mainly use this minimal condition in the remainder of this paper.
Interestingly, this condition has a first-order stochastic dominance interpretation,
because 0 ) , , ( > S D y j j r  directly implies that for some specification of  j F
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with strict inequality for at least one 
1 Â Î w , i.e. the evaluated netput vector  j y  is first-
order stochastically dominated by another feasible vector. Consistency of choice
behavior with the first-order stochastic dominance criterion is in fact equivalent to
monotonically increasing U in the expected utility framework (Hadar and Russell,
1969). However, it is also widely accepted as a choice criterion in non-expected utility
theories. Moreover, it is supported well by empirical evidence. As Starmer (2000)
summarizes, first order stochastically dominated options are usually not selected when
stochastic dominance is transparent. This holds a fortiori for the even weaker decision
criterion we end up with in our empirical tests, i.e.  0 ) , , ( £ S D y j j r .10
3.  ADDITIONAL PRICE, PREFERENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS
The test statistic  ) , , ( S D y j j r  as defined above only involves very weak assumptions
concerning the price distribution (specifying the price domain  j D ), firm preferences
(monotonicity, or alternatively consistency with the first-order stochastic dominance
criterion) and technology (observed netput choices  T S Í ). Actually, the above
optimality test simultaneously tests for optimizing firm behavior and these weak
assumptions. That is, violations of the minimal profit maximization conditions can
reflect inappropriate assumptions about price domains, preferences and/or technology.
Still, we emphasize that the profit maximization conditions derived above are much
weaker than the conditions traditionally considered in non-parametric production
analysis. Sometimes it is possible to formulate stronger price, preference and technology
assumptions, which entail more stringent tests with more discriminating power.
Conversely, we could employ the above-described general framework for testing more
stringent hypotheses. Specifically, if we assume optimizing behavior, we can test a
particular set of assumptions by comparing the test results for a model that imposes
these assumptions with a model that does not impose these assumptions. If the test
results do not change (i.e. all observations pass the optimality tests in both instances),
then the set of assumptions cannot be rejected. In addition, given that more stringent
assumptions imply more powerful tests, one could also specify price, preference and
technology assumptions taking into account the power of the concomitant optimality11
tests with respect to (arbitrary) alternative hypotheses of non-optimal behavior, in the
spirit of Bronars (1987).
In the following, we discuss a number of price, preference and technology assumptions
that are frequently maintained in applied and theoretical work. While this list is far from
exhaustive, it clearly illustrates the generality of our framework.
PRICE ASSUMPTIONS
In the extreme case no information is available about the price formation process and
q
j D + Â = . It is immediate that the condition  0 ) , , ( £ S D y j j r  would always be met.
Profit maximizing firm behavior cannot be rejected, which is intuitive precisely because
of the absence of information. At a minimal level we can specify the “generic” price
domain 
q
j D + Â Ì , as we have considered in the previous section. At a maximum level,
the conditional distribution function  j F  is fully specified. This immediately allows us to
perform the first-order stochastic dominance test (see (7)). A less stringent informational
requirement is to specify non-generic price domains that depend on the specific netput
values, i.e. at each y the price domain can be characterized as  () y D j . In addition, under
price endogeneity but price certainty these sets  () y D j  will be singletons (as in Varian,
1984, section 10). A straightforward extension of the analysis above gives the
appropriate test statistic. Of course, the specification of the endogenous price system,
and thus of these non-generic price domains, is typically an application-specific matter.12
Alternatively, we can postulate that prices are exogenous but uncertain at the time of
decision making. Every two netput vectors are then to be compared at the same price
vector, and we get






min max ) , , ( r .
See also Kuosmanen and Post (1999b). Furthermore, firms may face price endogeneity
on some input or output markets while prices are exogenous on other markets. The
corresponding test statistics are straightforward combinations of those in (4) and (6).
Finally, when prices are exogenous and certain, the price domain  { } j j p D = , and we
obtain the conventional test statistic for profit maximizing firm behavior (see e.g.
Varian, 1984)
(7)   () j j j S y j j
X p y p y S D y - =
Î
max ) , , ( r .
PREFERENCE ASSUMPTIONS
A full characterization of U immediately allows us to compute  ( ) S U D y j j j , , , J  or, under
a fully specified j F , even  ( ) S U F y j j j , , , q . Weaker preference assumptions can equally
well be implemented. For example, a frequently maintained assumption is that firms are
risk neutral so that only expected profit matters. In that case firm j’s netput selection is
always evaluated at the same (expected) price vector when comparing it to other
possible netput choices. Under price endogeneity this does not change the formal13
structure of the optimality test (see (4)). However, (when  j D  is convex) combination
with price exogeneity yields instead of (6)
(8) () p y p y S D y j




Î Î max min ) , , ( r .
Evidently, when complete information about F  is available, we can determine the
(unique) expected price vector, and we get a construction that is formally similar to (7).
Clearly, while we will not explore this in detail in this paper, other restrictions regarding
risk preferences can be included through specification of the Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion or the measure of relative risk aversion.
TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS
Additional technological assumptions can also be imposed and tested. For example,
monotonicity of T (or free disposability of inputs and outputs) is frequently assumed.
We can impose this assumption by replacing the set of observations S by its monotone
hull (i.e.  ()
q S S m + Â - = ), so as to increase discriminating power. In addition, convexity
of  T can be imposed by using  () S c , the convex hull of S, and monotonicity and
convexity can be imposed simultaneously by using the convex monotone hull  () () S m c .
In addition, other technology properties (e.g. returns-to-scale specifications) can be
investigated. (See e.g. Färe et al. (1994) for an overview of possible technology
representations that build on the set S and some additional technology postulates.)14
Finally, homogeneity (constant returns-to-scale), homotheticity and separability
conditions (and tests) can be implemented, like for example in Varian (1984).
1
It is worth to emphasize that the role of monotonicity and convexity assumptions under
conditions of endogenous and uncertain prices is very different from that in the
neoclassical setting with exogenous and certain prices. Varian (1984; following
Samuelson, 1947, and Hanoch and Rothschild, 1972) demonstrated that monotonicity
and convexity assumptions are harmless (i.e. do not interfere with the test results) if
prices are exogenous and certain. In that case, the objective (profit) is an increasing and
linear function of the netputs.
More generally, monotonicity and convexity of the constraint set are harmlessly
imposed if the objective function is monotonically increasing and quasi-convex.
Unfortunately, this condition is rather stringent for the alternative price conditions
discussed in this paper. For example, risk aversion can violate quasi-convexity.
However, many elementary facts of economic life seem to indicate a prevalence of risk
aversion (the standard assumption for utility functions is (quasi-)concavity rather than
quasi-convexity!). Therefore, in general we cannot safely replace the set S with m(S),
c(S) or c(m(S)) in the tests discussed in this paper.
2
                                                          
1 To keep our discussion focused, we will not explore these technology properties in detail here. The
extensions of the Varian results are obvious for the homogeneity and homotheticity properties. Extending
the separability results is more complicated (e.g. we would need an appropriate redefinition of the
“Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences” (see also Varian, 1982)).
2 Note that monotonicity becomes a harmless regularity property if a generic price domain is used for all
firms. However, in the case where non-generic price domains are employed, monotonicity cannot be
imposed without harm in general.15
Interestingly, there is no a priori reason why technologies should be monotone or
convex, although such properties are frequently imposed. For example, Farrell (1959)
stresses indivisible netputs and economies of scale and specialization as possible sources
of non-convexities. In addition, Färe and Grosskopf (1983) stress congestion of netputs
as possible violation of monotonicity. McFadden (1978, pp. 9) explicitly states that the
appeal of monotonicity and convexity assumptions in microeconomic production theory
“lies in their analytical convenience rather than in their economic realism.”
To conclude, as for price and preference assumptions, including additional production
assumptions can increase the discriminating power of the tests. However, it also
introduces the risk of specification error, i.e. the profit maximization hypothesis may be
wrongly rejected because of erroneous production assumptions. Since it is difficult to
verify a priori frequently imposed technology properties such as monotonicity and
convexity, we see the possibility to expose these technology properties to (non-
parametric) empirical tests as an attractive by-product of our approach.
4.  RECOVERABILITY AND FORECASTING
Varian (1984) emphasized alternative uses of the non-parametric approach in addition to
testing for profit maximizing firm behavior, viz. recovering the production set and
forecasting firm behavior under alternative price scenarios. Chavas and Cox (1995), for
example, applied the non-parametric approach for these uses to a real-life data set.
Recoverability and forecasting questions can also be addressed within the general16
framework that is discussed in this paper. To ease the exposition, our discussion will
concentrate on the minimal test obtained in section 2, but straightforward extensions
apply to the refinements discussed in section 3.
RATIONALIZATION
Varian (1984) started from a concept of data rationalization. We generalize that concept
towards settings that are possibly characterized by price uncertainty and endogeneity.
Using  {} n D D ,..., 1 = D , a production set 
q X Â Í  rationalizes the data set S if and only if
all observations pass the optimality test, i.e.
(9) ( ) D ´ Î " £ S D y X D y j j j j , 0 ) , , ( r .
Since we adhere to the standard assumption  T S Í , our following discussion will center
on cases where the data set 'rationalizes itself', i.e.  ( ) D ´ Î " £ S D y S D y j j j j , 0 ) , , ( r .
RECOVERING TECHNOLOGY
Generally, multiple empirical production sets can rationalize the data set. It is therefore
interesting to “bound” these sets. By assuming  T S Í , we directly find the observed
netput vectors S as an inner bound. The outer bound should include all production
vectors 
q y Â Î  so that {} S y È  still rationalizes S.  We can define it as
(10) {} () { } D ´ Î " £ È Â Î = D G S D y S y D y y S j j j j
q , 0 ) , , ( ) , ( r .17
In effect, any production set 
q X S Â Í Í  that rationalizes the observed set of firms
must satisfy  ) , ( D G Í S X .
FORECASTING
The consistency tests as developed above can also be employed to non-parametrically
forecast firm behavior. Like in Varian (1984) an exact prediction cannot be obtained, but
rather the widest range of choices that is consistent with the previously observed (ex
ante profit maximizing) behavior is derived. Specifically, for a given price domain
q D + Â Í , this range is represented by the set
(11) { } 0 ) , , ( ) , (   ) , , ( £ Â Î Ç D G = D S D y y S S D P
q r .
The set  () D , ,D S P  contains all vectors 
q y Â Î  that belong to  ) , ( D G S  and that are
consistent with the profit maximization hypothesis for the given price domain D when
compared to the observed sample S.
Section 6 illustrates these alternative uses of the consistency tests using a numerical
example.18
5.  COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES
To conclude our formal exposition, we briefly elaborate on the computation of the test
statistic ) , , ( S D y j j r , which is also relevant for the construction of the sets  ) , ( D G S  and
() D , ,D S P . Linear Programming tools suffice if the price domain is formulated in terms
of linear inequalities. For example, the following convex cone
(12) { } j j
q
j b p A p D ³ Â Î = + ,
represents the price domain in terms of l linear inequalities, with Aj  a  m l´  matrix and
j b  a  1 ´ l  vector. Such a cone can often be constructed in practice. For example, a single
linear inequality can represent the assumption that the cost of equity capital exceeds that
debt capital, and that the wage rate of white-collar workers exceeds that of blue-collar
workers. Interestingly, such convex cones are applied extensively in Operations
Research/Management Science applications of the non-parametric productivity and
efficiency analysis (sometimes dubbed Data Envelopment Analysis), starting with
Charnes  et al. (1990) (see e.g. Allen et al. (1997) for an insightful survey). Kuosmanen
and Post (1999a) discuss how to use the convex cones for measuring economic
efficiency in the traditional setting with exogenous and certain prices.
When the price domain is formulated in terms of linear inequalities, we can compute
) , , ( S D y j j r  (if defined) from the maximum of the solutions to the following n linear
programming problems:19
(13) { } S y b p A yp yp j j
p D p q
j
Î " ³ =
+ Â Î Î min min ,
and the solution to the following Linear Programming problem:
(14) { } j j j
p




+ Â Î Î
max max .







ì D ´ Î " £ Â Î = D G
Î Î S D y p y yp y S j j j
D p D p
q
j j
, max min ) , (
can be characterized by a set of linear constraints. Finally, for given D, the specification
of the set () D , ,D S P  is analogous to that of  ) , ( D G S .
6.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the above concepts and tools, consider a sample of three firms
{} 3 2 1 , , y y y S =  that operate under a single input-single output technology. For
expositional convenience, we concentrate on the minimal test outlined in section 2.
Table 1 displays the input and output data and the price domains for the three firms.
Clearly, 0 ) , , ( £ S D y j j r  for  3 , 2 , 1 = j  and thus the data set at least rationalizes itself.20
The largest production set that rationalizes the data set (i.e. the outer bound technology
approximation) is formally defined as
(16) () { } 0 ; 0 ; 5 . 12 3 ; 6 2 ; 1 , 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 ³ £ £ + £ + £ + Â Î = D G y y y y y y y y y S .
This set is displayed in figure 1. This figure also clearly reveals that (ex ante) profit
maximizing production vectors need not lie on the technically efficient boundary of the
technology approximation if one departs from the neoclassical price conditions.
Essentially, this occurs because profit may increase when netput amounts decrease under
endogenous prices.
j ( )
2 1 , j j y y j D
1 (-4,2) { } 5 . 2 1 ; 1
2 1 2 £ £ = Â Î + p p p
2 (-3,3) { } 3 2 ; 1
2 1 2 £ £ = Â Î + p p p
3 (-5,5) { } 5 . 3 3 ; 1
2 1 2 £ £ = Â Î + p p p
Table 1 Example data set21
Fig. 1 Recovering technology
Next, suppose that we want to forecast firm behavior for the price domain
{ } 5 . 0 25 . 0 ; 1 2 1
2 £ £ = Â Î = + p p p DA . All netput choices that are consistent with
observed past behavior are contained in:
(17) { } 25 . 2 5 . 0 ) , (   ) , , ( 2 1 - ³ + Â Î Ç D G = D y y y S S D P
q
A ,
Figure 2 displays this set as the dark shaded area. As the price domain shrinks, the
predictions will become more accurate. For example, for  () {} 5 . 0 , 1 = B D  we have






















which is displayed in Figure 2 as the light shaded area. Obviously,
() () D Ì D , , , , S D P S D P A B .
To conclude, we note that the outer bound approximation will generally become smaller
when the number of observations in the sample increases, as the number of inequalities
that determine the outer bound will increase. As a result, more precise predictions of
firm actions can be made.
Fig. 2 Forecasting firm behavior
7.  DISCUSSION
We have introduced non-parametric tests for the hypothesis that firms (ex ante) seek to
maximize profits, which also apply when prices are endogenous and/or uncertain. In




















firm behavior can be forecasted non-parametrically. Thus, even when we account for the
possibility of endogenous and uncertain prices, non-parametric analysis of the
production process remains feasible and essentially the same kind of questions can be
addressed as under the (standard) neoclassical price conditions.
By building on a minimal set of maintained assumptions, we minimize Type I errors, i.e.
the probability that the profit maximization hypothesis is wrongly rejected. However,
violations of the optimality conditions may still be observed. We see two alternative
interpretations for such violations:
1.  Our maintained assumptions may be wrong. We have focused on a minimal set of
maintained assumptions, and (when compared to the conventional approach) we
excluded imperfect competition or price uncertainty as possible sources of Type I
error. Nonetheless, some of our assumptions may still lead to erroneous rejections of
the profit maximization hypothesis. We see at least the following four different Type
I errors:
A.  We adhered to the standard assumption that the observed data set represents
feasible production vectors (i.e.  T S Í ). Measurement error and omission of
input or output variables can violate this assumption. We could therefore extend
to this new setting established tools that account for statistical significance
(Varian, 1985; and Matzkin, 1994) and economic significance (Varian, 1990) of
violations of the test results.24
B.  We may doubt whether firms in endogenous price settings are really interested
in maximizing profits. While in a neoclassical framework maximum profit is
usually accepted without question as the right objective for a firm, matters
become more complicated under imperfect competition, as already pointed out
by Marshall (1922, p. 402). The main argument is that firm owners are not
interested in monetary profit as such but rather in its purchasing power. Owner
preferences as consumer may interfere with owner preferences as producer.
Grodal (1996) has more recently emphasized this point. Nevertheless, profit
maximization is generally maintained as a behavioral assumption when
modeling firm behavior under endogenous prices (see e.g. Hart, 1985). Also for
this reason, it is interesting to expose the profit maximization hypothesis under
price endogeneity to empirical tests.
C.  We have assumed throughout that a price domain can be specified that reflects
the possibly endogenous and uncertain price formation process. If no specific
price information is included, our tests lose discriminatory power. However, an
erroneously specified price domain may lead to erroneously rejecting the profit
maximization hypothesis. Hence, it is important to formulate the maintained
price assumptions (as reflected in the price domain) with sufficient caution.
Alternatively, as we have illustrated, we could use our testing tools to
reconstruct the price mechanisms faced by the firms under evaluation.
D.  Finally, although we accounted for price uncertainty, we have held on to a
deterministic technology. That is, we have assumed throughout that the output
amounts produced and the input quantities consumed by firms were perfectly25
certain. For some industries (e.g. agriculture), this is not a very realistic
assumption. This calls for developing testing tools that take such quantity
uncertainty explicitly into account. Such tools could for example be constructed
along similar lines as those followed in this paper. For example, the argument
would be straightforwardly reversed if prices were the perfectly controllable
decision variables and netput quantities the uncertain random variables.
2.  On the other hand, when we could reasonably conjecture that our maintained
assumptions hold, remaining violations of the profit maximization conditions we
have set out can be interpreted as truly profit inefficient behavior (compare with
Banker and Maindiratta, 1988). Such firm-level inefficiency could for example be
rationalized by relating it to agency problems within the firm. That is, the firm may
not act in accordance with profit maximization because the firm managers, who
pursue different goals, are not fully controlled by the firm owners. In effect, negative
test results do not immediately indicate “irrational” behavior, as the firm managers
may act rational. Rather, they suggest inconsistency of firm behavior with the owner
preferences. In this respect, it seems worthwhile to explore whether and to what
extent the testing tools could be employed as monitoring instruments by the firm
owners (compare with Bogetoft, 1994).
A second issue concerns the discriminating power of our tools. Clearly, the use of
minimal assumptions can reduce such discriminating power. Still, our analysis can serve
as a starting point for models that include additional information. In that respect, we
have shown that our tools are very flexible in that they allow for implementing a whole
range of alternative price, preference and technology assumptions. In fact, our general26
framework can be employed for obtaining evidence in favor of or against certain price,
preference and technology specifications.
To conclude, we point at the analogy between producer and consumer behavior. For
example, both the Afriat (1972) and Varian (1984) contributions have twin papers that
focus on non-parametric demand analysis (respectively Afriat, 1967, and Varian, 1982).
This might then again result in less stringent but possibly more realistic tests for
“rational” consumer behavior, and consequently contribute to a better understanding of
demand behavior.
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